Articles Posted in Oil and Gas Law

In Texas, the Natural Resources Code, in Section 91.402  governs when royalties must be paid to royalty owners. Section 91.402(b) provides that royalty payments may be withheld without interest if there is a dispute concerning title that would affect distribution of payments or if there is a requirement in a title opinion that places in issue the title, identity or whereabouts of the payee and that is not been satisfied by the payee after a reasonable request for curative information.

Representative Reggie Smith, a Republican from Sherman, Texas, has introduced House Bill 3262, which would amend Section 91.402(b) to deprive royalty owners of the right to sue their oil company operator for a breach of contract to recover royalty payments that are withheld due to a title dispute unless the lease states otherwise. The specific language of the bill is that “a payee does not have a common-law cause of action against a payor for withholding payments under Subsection (b) unless, for a dispute concerning the title, the contract requiring payment specifies otherwise“. In other words, if an unscrupulous oil company is short of funds and holds back your royalties to use them as operating expenses under the guise of a trumped up title dispute, the royalty owner has no recourse!

This is a bad bill for a number of reasons, and it will hopefully not pass. Oil companies are already protected in the case of title disputes by Section 91.402 of the Natural Resources Code and there is no logical reason to add this language. Mineral owners with new leases can add language to their lease to counteract this bill, but that is no comfort to mineral owners whose leases are already signed.

Given the stresses on the oil and gas industry over the last year, it’s not surprising that there have been many oil company bankruptcies, both in Texas and throughout the country. Royalty owners throughout Texas have been getting notices that the operator who is paying their royalties have filed for bankruptcy. In most cases, the oil company is filing a Chapter 11 proceeding, which is a reorganization, although a few have filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, which is a liquidation.

In the 1980s, the Texas Legislature added a provision to the Texas Business and Commerce Code to assist royalty owners. It is known as the “First Purchaser Statute” and is found in TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.343. The statute states, in part:

This section provides a security interest in favor of interest owners, as secured parties, to secure the obligations of the first purchaser of oil and gas production, as debtor, to pay the purchase price. An authenticated record giving the interest owner a right under real property law operates as a security agreement created under this chapter. The act of the first purchaser in signing an agreement to purchase oil or gas production, in issuing a division order, or in making any other voluntary communication to the interest owner or any governmental agency recognizing the interest owner’s right operates as an authentication of a security agreement in accordance with Section 9.203(b) for purposes of this chapter.

As a Texas oil and gas attorney, I often find it necessary, when negotiating an oil and gas lease for a client, to add an addendum that modifies some of the terms in the printed lease. The printed lease form is often extremely operator oriented and does not give the mineral owner many rights. Very often, the printed lease will provide for deduction of post-production costs from royalties due to the mineral owner by providing that royalties shall be calculated “at the well”. In the addendum, we often add language that provides that royalty shall be calculated, not on the market value at the well, but instead on the gross proceeds received by the oil and gas operator. The result of that language in the addendum is that post-production costs cannot be deducted from the royalties.

In the recent Texas Supreme Court decision of BlueStone Natural Resources II LLC v. Walker Murray Randle et al, the printed oil and gas lease contained language that indicated that the royalties would be calculated on the market value at the mouth of the well. Prior decisions by the Texas Supreme Court determined that this language allows the well operator to deduct post-production costs. The operator and the mineral owner agreed to an addendum that stated that royalties would be based instead on the “gross value received” by the operator. The addendum also stated that if the addendum was in conflict with the printed lease provisions, then the addendum would control and prevail.

Once production was obtained on the well, the operator proceeded to deduct post-production costs. The mineral owner sued. The operator argued that the “at the well” language is the only lease language providing a valuation point, so nothing in the addendum can be considered contradictory to that portion of the printed lease’s royalty provision.

The El Paso Court of Appeals recently decided a case that involved the use of the surface of land by a solar farm that was objected to by the Lyles, the  mineral owners of the property. That case is Lyle et al v. Midway Solar LLC et al. 

The Defendant Midway operated a large solar facility on the property in Pecos County, Texas under a 55 year lease with the surface owner. The solar leases designated drill sites for the benefit of future oil and gas production at either end of the property. The drill sites were about 30% of the surface area. The mineral owners claimed that the solar panels and transmission and electrical lines and cables serving the facility interfered with their ability to produce their mineral interests. At the time of the litigation, the mineral owners did not have an active oil and gas lease for the property and were not actively seeking a lease. In fact, the Court noted that “(i)t is undisputed that the Lyles have never leased out their interests to any oil and gas operators and have no current plans to lease their estate or to otherwise develop their mineral interests at this time. They have commissioned no geological studies, nor entered into any drilling contracts for the minerals. Since January 1, 2015, the Lyles had not received a single request to lease or purchase the mineral estate in Section 14. And the Lyles conceded they had no plans for drilling any wells.”

The mineral owners filed suit based on several claims, including a claim that the solar panels were a trespass, and requested that the Court order all solar panels and related lines be removed from the property. The Defendants claimed that the accommodation doctrine authorized their surface use.

The San Antonio Court of Appeals recently issued an interesting opinion regarding a well operator’s claim that H2S/CO2 from a nearby injection well damaged its leased minerals. The case has been appealed to the Texas Supreme Court and oral argument has been scheduled for December 2020.

The case is Swift Energy Operating, LLC v. Regency Field Services LLC. In 2009, Swift, the Plaintiff, leased approximately 4200 acres of a ranch in McMullen County, Texas and operated a number of producing wells on the ranch. In 2006, Regency obtained a permit from the Texas Railroad Commission to operate an injection well in which they would dispose of a gas mixture of concentrated hydrogen sulfide (H2S) and carbon dioxide (CO2) by pumping it into the Wilcox formation. In its application for the permit, Regency submitted a plume model to the Railroad Commission that predicted that the injected material would spread horizontally by approximately 2200 feet after 40 years of injection. The review by the Railroad Commission staff indicated that they believed that shale formations above and below the disposal zone would prevent vertical migration of the injected gas.

In 2012, another operator in the area discovered H2S in one of the its wells and testing indicated it came from the Regency injection well. As result, that operator had to plug and abandon that well. An employee of that operator emailed Swift about these developments.

The Texas Eleventh Court of Appeals decided yet another “continuous development” case in which the lessee tries to wiggle out of its obligations under the oil and gas lease with a strained interpretation of the lease terms (although in this case, both the lessor and the lessee were oil companies).

In Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v. Energen Resources Corporation, the oil and gas lease contained a continuous development clause that said:

If this lease is extended as to non-dedicated acreage beyond the expiration of the primary term hereof, this lease shall terminate as to non-dedicated acreage one hundred fifty (150) days after the expiration of the primary term unless during such one hundred fifty (150) day period Lessee has commenced operations for the drilling of a well in which case this lease shall be extended as to the dedicated and non-dedicated acreage so long as operations for the drilling of a subsequent well are commenced within one hundred fifty (150) days after the completion of the preceding well. This lease shall terminate as to all non-dedicated acreage any time a subsequent well is not commenced within one hundred fifty (150) days from the completion of a preceding well.

The Texas Court of Appeals in El Paso, in HJSA No. 3, Ltd. P’ship v. Sundown Energy LP,  issued a decision siding with the landowner on the interpretation of an oil and gas lease regarding the meaning of “continuous development“.

The oil and gas lease contained two paragraphs related to drilling:

7(b). The first such continuous development well shall be spudded-in on or before the sixth anniversary of the Effective Date, with no more than 120 days to elapse between completion or abandonment of operations on one well and commencement of drilling operations on the next ensuing well.

In Piranha Partners et al v. Joe B. Neuhoff et al,  the Texas Supreme Court examined a written assignment of an overriding royalty interest in minerals produced from land subject to an oil and gas lease in Wheeler County, Texas. The Neuhoffs claimed the assignment conveyed an interest only in production from the well specifically identified in the assignment. Piranha Partners claimed that the assignment conveyed an interest in production from any well drilled on the identified land, or alternatively, in all production under the identified lease.

The assignment stated:

[Neuhoff Oil] does hereby assign, sell and convey unto [Piranha] . . . without warranty or covenant of title, express or implied, subject to the limitations, conditions, reservations and exceptions hereinafter set forth . . . all of [Neuhoff Oil’s] right, title and interest in and to the properties described in Exhibit “A” (the “Properties”)

The Texas rule against perpetuities (the “Rule”) was something all lawyers learned about in law school, but it seemed at the time like a concept we would not run into very often in real life law practice. Unfortunately, it comes up regularly in connection with Texas oil and gas leases and related interests.

In Texas, the Rule states that a property interest must vest within 21 years after the death of some life or lives in being at the time of the conveyance of that property interest. If it does not, then the interest is a perpetuity. Perpetuities are prohibited by Texas Constitution Article 1, section 26 as restraints on free alienation of property. A conveyance that violates the Rule is void.

In Tommy Yowell v. Granite Operating Company et al, the Texas Supreme Court had occasion to review a claim that an overriding royalty interest (ORRI) violated the Rule. As many of you know, an ORRI is a share of either oil and gas production or revenue from that production that is carved out of a lessee’s interest under an oil and gas lease. In most cases, when the oil and gas lease to which the ORRI is attached terminates, the ORRI terminates as well. In this case, the ORRI contained a provision that purported to cover any extension or renewal of the existing lease as well as any new leases. When the operator of a new lease stopped paying royalties to Yowells, they sued.

The Texas 14^th Court of Appeals recently interpreted a pipeline easement and that interpretation may have application for many other pipeline easements in existence in Texas. The case is Texas Land & Cattle II, Ltd. v ExxonMobil Pipeline Company.

Texas Land & Cattle (TLC) owned real property in Harris County, Texas. ExxonMobil owned a pipeline easement across this property. ExxonMobil was the successor in interest to Humble Oil Company who originally obtained the easement. The easement granted the right to operate a pipeline for the “transportation of oil or gas”. The easement did not define oil or gas.

ExxonMobil had transported gasoline and diesel through this pipeline since 1995. TLC sued ExxonMobil on the grounds that transporting gasoline and diesel was not allowed by the easement. TLC believed the terms “oil and gas” included only crude oil or crude oil petroleum, but not any refined products. ExxonMobil claimed that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “oil and gas” as used in an easement have always included refined products like gasoline and diesel. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by TLC and granted the relief sought by ExxonMobil.